The Recession of 1937-38 is often cited as illustrating the dangers of withdrawing fiscal and monetary stimulus too early in a weak recovery. Yet our understanding of this severe downturn is incomplete: existing studies find that changes in fiscal policy were small in comparison to the magnitude of the downturn and that higher reserve requirements were not binding on banks. This paper focuses on a neglected change in monetary policy, the sterilization of gold inflows during 1937, and finds that it exerted a powerful contractionary force during this period. The transmission of this monetary shock to the real economy appears to have worked through lower asset (equity) prices and higher interest rates.
Introduction
The Recession of 1937-38 was America's second most severe economic downturn in the twentieth century, the first being the Great Depression of 1929-33. Real GDP contracted 11 percent and industrial production plunged 30 percent between the second quarter of 1937 and the first quarter of 1938. The civilian unemployment rate, still high in the aftermath of the Great Depression, rose from 9.2 percent to 12.5 percent.
1 Because this sharp downturn occurred when recovery from the Depression was far from complete, it became known as the "recession within a depression." It set back the recovery from the Depression by two years.
The recession is often blamed on the tightening of fiscal and monetary policies. In terms of fiscal policy, the Roosevelt administration became concerned about large budget deficits and began reducing the growth in government spending and increasing taxes. In terms of monetary policy, the Federal Reserve and Treasury became concerned about the inflationary potential of excess reserves in the banking system and large gold inflows and therefore decided to double reserve requirements and sterilize gold inflows.
Yet the evidence that these policy changes were responsible for the severe downturn is underwhelming. Although Brown (1956) finds that the fiscal contraction amounted to a swing in demand of 2.5 percent of GDP in 1938, Romer (1992, 766 ) finds a relatively small fiscal 1 Quarterly GDP data is from Gordon (1986) , available at http://www.nber.org/data/abc/. Industrial production data is available from the Federal Reserve at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/iphist/iphist_sa.txt. Unemployment is from the Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition, series Ba475. The recession of 1920-21 is sometimes thought to be the second worst U.S. economic downturn in the twentieth century, but Romer (1988) casts serious doubt on this view. 2 In 1936, over President Roosevelt's veto, Congress enacted a large veterans bonus that was distributed in June 1936 and again (by half as much) in June 1937 and then not at all in 1938. Much of the reduction in spending was simply the ending of the veterans bonus. In addition, in January 1937, the government began collecting social security taxes (without equivalent payouts) and undistributed profits tax, although the amounts collected were relatively small. 2 multiplier during this period and argues that "it would be very difficult" to attribute most of the decline in output to fiscal policy. 3 And while Friedman and Schwartz (1963) put great emphasis on the contractionary impact of higher reserve requirements, subsequent studies have found little support for this conclusion. For example, Calomiris, Mason, and Wheelock (2011) note that banks held large excess reserves at the time, and that they did not increase their demand for reserves after the new requirements took effect. The reserve requirements were not binding on the banks and therefore they had little, if any, effect on the money multiplier and the supply of money and credit. 4 If these factors cannot be blamed for the severity of the recession, might the big "policy mistake" of the period have been the sterilization of gold inflows? 5 Unfortunately, the quantitative significance of the gold sterilization policy has never been fully assessed. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 544) maintained that "The combined impact of the rise in reserve requirements and -no less important -the Treasury gold-sterilization program first sharply reduced the rate of increase in the monetary stock and then converted it into a decline" (emphasis added).
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Yet they did not provide any direct empirical evidence to support the conclusion that the gold sterilization policy was "no less important" than the change in reserve requirements.
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Though understudied by economists, the decision by the Treasury Department to sterilize 3 Peppers (1973) later increased the Brown estimate to 3.4 percent of GDP. 4 Other studies on the impact of the reserve requirement changes include Cole and Ohanian (1999) , Telser (2001-02) , Stauffer (2002) , and Hanes (2006) . 5 There could have been other factors behind the recession. Eggertsson and Pugsley (2006) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices and rational expectations and argue that the recession was due to an "exogenous shift in beliefs" about future policy by policymakers, i.e., statements by policymakers reflecting concern about inflation. Yet it seems implausible to think that "animal spirits" could sink the economy as much as occurred during 1937-38 in the absence of some tangible change in government policy or some real shock. Hausman (2011) finds that unionization at General Motors and Chrysler led to anticipated price increases which diverted a significant amount of auto sales from 1938 to 1937, abetting the later downturn. 6 In fact, Friedman and Schwartz pay relatively little attention to the Treasury decision, while devoting several pages to the change in reserve requirements. 7 Beckworth and Hendrickson (2011) Romer (1992) points out, the inflow of gold from Europe -and the consequent expansion of the monetary base and money supply -was the driving force behind the economic recovery from the Depression. The sterilization policy severed the link between gold inflows and monetary expansion. This paper seeks to quantify the impact of the gold sterilization on the money supply and to compare it to the monetary impact of the change in reserve requirements. The contributions of each to the decline in the money supply can, in principle, be traced because the Treasury's policy of gold sterilization operates through the monetary base while the Federal Reserve's policy of higher reserve requirements operates through the money multiplier. This paper reports several findings. First, the change in the monetary base as a result of sterilization was large. As much as a 10 percent increase in the monetary base in 1937 was prevented as a consequence of the program. Second, the monetary base was a more important source of change than the money multiplier in leading to the tighter monetary policy in the period going into the recession. This suggests that, although the Federal Reserve is often blamed for its poor policy choices during the Great Depression, the Treasury Department was largely responsible for the policy tightening during this period. Third, the end of the sterilization program and the resumption of large gold inflows coincide with the onset of the economic recovery. By contrast, the hike in reserve requirements was only partially rolled back and does not appear to have contributed to the relaxation of monetary conditions. Fourth, the sterilization 4 policy appears to have been transmitted to the real economy through lower asset prices and slightly higher interest rates. Together, these findings suggest that monetary policy was a key factor behind the 1937-38 recession.
Monetary Policy and the Recession
The Roosevelt administration's decision to take the United States off the gold standard in April 1933 was the proximate cause of the end of the Great Depression and the start of the economic recovery (Temin and Wigmore 1990, Eggertsson 2008) . By freeing monetary policy from the responsibility of maintaining a fixed dollar price of gold, the decision permitted a more expansionary policy that ended the deflation, reduced nominal and real interest rates, allowed the foreign exchange value of the dollar to depreciate, and thereby stimulated the economy.
In January 1934, after a period of monetary instability, the United States fixed the price of gold at $35 per ounce. While this did not constitute a formal return to the gold standard, the United States shadowed the gold standard in that changes in gold reserves were reflected in changes in the monetary base. Monetary policy was completely passive to these changes in gold reserves and the Federal Reserve did not engage in any significant open market operations Schwartz 1963, Meltzer 2003) .
The United States also began experiencing large gold inflows starting in 1934, something that is often attributed to the revaluation of gold and political difficulties in Europe. This proved to be the major source of monetary expansion over the next few years. As Romer (1992) argues, expansionary monetary policy was a critical part of the recovery from the Great Depression.
Real GDP grew 11 percent a year, on average, between 1933 and 1936.
With the economy operating with substantial excess capacity, this monetary expansion did not lead to a problem with inflation. Wholesale prices were virtually unchanged during 1935 and into the first half of 1936. However, while consumer prices remained steady, wholesale prices began to rise briskly in the second half of 1936. By December of that year, they were 4 percent higher than they had been a year before. Meanwhile, gold continued to pour in from abroad and banks continued to accumulate large excess reserves, which Treasury and Federal
Reserve officials viewed as an increasing risk of inflation.
With prices beginning to accelerate and gold inflows contributing to a rising stock market, President Roosevelt also became concerned about overheating, even though unemployment remained quite high. The president wanted to reduce speculative capital inflows -"hot money," he called it -without reducing domestic investment (Meltzer 2003, 505 Eventually, both policies were adopted. Without informing the Treasury, the Federal Reserve increased reserve requirements for member banks from 13 percent to 19.5 percent in August 1936. In December 1936 the Treasury announced that it would begin sterilizing all changes to U.S. gold reserves, whether they arise from gold inflows or domestic production. In January 1937, the Federal Reserve announced that reserve requirements would be further increased in March and May of that year, to 22.75 percent and then to 26 percent. Thus, between August 1936 and May 1937, reserve requirements for member banks were doubled.
6
The U.S. economy reached a business cycle peak in mid-1937. 9 As late as June 1937, the Federal Open Market Committee still viewed gold inflows as the most important problem that it faced. It was also concerned that the Treasury might end its sterilization program (Meltzer 2003, 523) . In September, industrial production began to plummet. By October, after a stock market crash and further bad economic news, government officials began to realize that they had a major contraction on their hands. In June 1938, the trough of the downturn was reached, according to both the NBER and Romer (1994) . Thereafter, the economy began a swift recovery. Gold inflows surged in the fall as European fears of war spread due to the crisis over Hitler's territorial demands on Czechoslovakia.
Treasury's Gold Sterilization Program
As noted earlier, fiscal policy is generally believed to have been a contributing factor to the recession of 1937-38, but one that is far from being able to explain the severity of the downturn. However, that the U.S. economy was hit by a pronounced monetary shock is beyond 7 dispute.
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As Figure 1 shows, the M2 measure of the money supply grew at a fairly consistent 12 percent annual rate between 1934 and 1936. In early 1937, it abruptly ceased growing and actually declined by the end of the year.
As noted earlier, economists have failed to uncover convincing evidence that the doubling of reserve requirements was responsible for this shift. Because banks held large excess reserves, the increased reserve requirements were not binding and do not appear to have constrained bank lending (Calomiris, Mason, and Wheelock 2011) . Furthermore, banks did not seek to build up their excess reserves to their previous level. This leaves the gold sterilization policy as the potentially important monetary factor in the downturn, but one whose quantitative significance has never been fully explored. 10 Velde (2009) By this time, the U.S. economy was clearly in a recession, and financial markets became suspicious that the Roosevelt administration might consider a devaluation of the dollar (an increase in the dollar price of gold) to deal with the recession. This is exactly how the Roosevelt administration dealt with the Great Depression when it took office, so there was clearly a precedent for such an action. As a result, gold inflows into the United States came to an abrupt halt. From November 1937 through January 1938, the United States actually lost a small amount of gold, and sterilization worked in reverse: the loss of gold did not translate into a reduction in the monetary base because it was offset by the Treasury's release of gold from its inactive account.
The sterilization program was effectively ended in February 1938, when the Treasury announced that it would no longer sterilize changes in gold reserves that were less than $100 million. In February and March 1938, gold inflows were extremely small and were not sterilized.
The Treasury program was formally terminated in April. The Treasury then shifted about $1.3 billion from its cash holdings to deposits in Federal Reserve banks. However, this was just an accounting change with no monetary effect; it was not until the Treasury spent the funds that they were actually monetized.
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The Treasury's exit strategy was to desterilize its inactive gold 11 As Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 511) The release of the inactive gold allowed growth in the monetary base to resume. But fears that the Roosevelt administration might address the recession by devaluing the dollar meant that gold was still not flowing back to the United States. In the absence of gold inflows, and once the inactive gold had been fully desterilized, the monetary base would stop growing again.
In June, President Roosevelt and Treasury Secretary Morgenthau firmly denied that they had any plans to devalue the dollar. Yet gold inflows did not resume in significant amounts until the crisis over Czechoslovakia in September led to fears of war and capital flight from Europe.
did not occur until more than a year after formal desterilization." Similarly, the Federal Reserve noted "as the result of the release of gold, funds in the amount of about $1,400,000,000 were added to Treasury deposits at the Federal Reserve banks, and as these funds are expended by the Treasury they will correspondingly increase member bank reserves" (Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1938, 344) . , Table 156 ). For sterilization, see the appendix to this paper. 
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To characterize the relationship between the two variables more formally, consider the following simple regression of the change in the log of the monetary base on the change in the log of the gold stock:
Δ log (monetary base t ) = α + β Δ log (gold stock t ) + ε t There should be a strong relationship between the change in the gold stock and the change in the monetary base between 1934 and 1936, but not after that point if sterilization is not taken into account. The potential for a structural break in the relationship can be tested by including a dummy variable that represent the sterilization period (December 1936 through January 1938).
The results in Table 1 simply confirm the pattern in Figure 3 . Changes in the gold stock explain changes in the monetary base very well, except during the period of sterilization. The coefficient on the interaction between the change in the gold stock and a dummy variable representing the sterilization period is nearly equal and opposite to the sign of the coefficient on the change in the gold stock, reflecting the sterilization offset. By contrast, the relationship between the monetary base and a measure of the monetized gold stock (adjust for sterilization)
shows no structural break during this period. A counter argument is that the sterilization program led to additional gold inflows.
Hanes (2006) finds that interest rates rose slightly around the time that the sterilization program was put into operation. This might have attracted gold to the United States that otherwise would not have come. This would make the conclusion that sterilization reduced the monetary base by 10 percent an overestimate.
Reserve Requirements or Gold Sterilization?
The gold sterilization program and the doubling of reserve requirements occurred at roughly the same time, making it difficult to determine which was most responsible for change in the money supply.
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Yet some assessment of the relative importance of the Federal Reserve's decision to increase reserve requirements and the Treasury's decision to sterilize gold inflows is necessary in order to reach a conclusion about the role of different economic policies during the 1930s.
One way the two policies can be disentangled is to note that Treasury's gold sterilization affected the monetary base, whereas the Fed's reserve requirement increases affected the money multiplier (via the deposit-reserve ratio). We have already seen that the sterilization program had a significant impact on the monetary base. Did changes in reserve requirements have a significant impact on the deposit-reserve ratio, and hence on the money multiplier and money supply? Figure 4 shows the path of the deposit-reserve ratio from 1934 to 1939. The first three vertical lines denote the increase in reserve requirements and the last the relaxation of reserve requirements. If the change in reserve requirements had an immediate impact on monetary conditions, we would expect to see a drop in the deposit-reserve ratio after an increase in the requirements and a rise in the ratio after a decrease in the requirements. The deposit-reserve ratio declines secularly over this period, but surprisingly, the ratio flattens out during the period when the reserve requirements were increased. Not until the very end of 1937, in December, well after the final increase in reserve requirements and the start of the recession, does the ratio begin to decline, but then only in line with its previous trend rate of decline.
This pattern is not consistent with the reserve requirements leading to tighter monetary conditions. In addition, the relaxation of the reserve requirements does not lead to an increase in the deposit-reserve ratio, as we might be expected. This makes it hard to attribute the easing of monetary conditions, that is, the resumption of growth in the money supply in late 1938, to the relaxation of reserve requirements. These patterns support the findings of Calomiris, Mason, and Wheelock (2011) that the higher reserve requirements were not binding. Source: Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , Table B -3, column 2.
To distinguish the contributions of sterilization and reserve requirements in terms of their impact on the money supply, we can undertake a decomposition in the spirit of Cagan (1965) .
The money stock M (measured by M2) is equal to where H is high powered money (the monetary base), C is currency in the hands of the public, R is reserves, and D is deposits. The change in the money supply can be decomposed into the changes in these components: I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Reserve requirements relaxed
Reserve requirements increased
where the first component is the contribution of the monetary base, the second is the change in the currency-money ratio, and the third is the change in the reserve-deposit ratio. In the two years prior to the sterilization of gold, the gold stock and high powered money (the monetary base) grew at an annual rate of 11.5 percent. Changes in the currency-money ratio were relatively small, but the higher reserve-deposit ratio meant that M2
grew at only about 8 percent. In the six months prior to the implementation of the sterilization program, gold reserves and high powered money increased at an annual rate of about 20 percent, but M2 growth was still about 8 percent due to an increase in the reserve-deposit ratio.
Over the nine months during which gold inflows were sterilized, from December 1936 to August 1937, the gold stock increased at a 16 percent annual rate, but high powered money only increased at about a 2 percent pace. During this period, the small changes in the reserve-deposit and the currency-money ratios offset each other. Thus, the sharp slowdown in the growth of high powered money was almost entirely responsible for the marked deceleration in the growth of the money supply.
During the gold scarcity period, August 1937 to February 1938, gold inflows largely ceased, so that sterilization made little difference. Gold inflows increased only 4 percent, while the monetary base increased by a greater amount because of the one-time desterilization of $300 million in September 1937. However, an increase in the reserve-deposit ratio offset the increase in high powered money and M2 actually fell.
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From February 1938 to August 1938, the Treasury desterilized its gold accumulation, allowing high powered money to increase at nearly a 13 percent annual rate even though gold inflows remained at a low level. However, this was not fully offset by a continued rise in the reserve-deposit ratio and the money supply expanded.
Finally, starting in August 1938 and the Czechoslovak crisis in Europe, gold inflows resumed and, with the sterilization program having been abandoned, monetary growth as well.
Gold reserves increased at an annual rate of more than 24 percent in the six months after August, allowing high powered money to grow more than 14 percent, with the offset coming from the reserve-deposit ratio. Thus, in the absence of sterilization, we would have expected the growth of the money supply to continue at its previous pace instead of declining sharply.
The Monetary Transmission Mechanism
The fact that gold sterilization produced a marked slowdown in the growth of the money supply says nothing about the way this shock was transmitted to the real economy. This paper deliberately stops short of examining the impact of these monetary changes on the real economy.
Economists who have studied the 1930s have broadly concluded that the monetary shocks of the period were an important source of fluctuations in real economic activity (Romer and Romer 1989 , McCallum 1990 , Romer 1992 , Bordo, Choudhri, and Schwartz 1995 , Velde 2009 , Beckworth and Hendrickson 2011 . Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to conclude that the sterilization policy succeeded in squelching incipient inflationary pressures, but at the cost of a major recession.
However, it may still be useful to know how the monetary changes may have affected the real economy. Changes in monetary conditions are transmitted to the economy through changes 22 in asset prices, interest rates, bank lending (credit channel), and exchange rates (Mishkin 1995) .
Although standard VAR analysis that use monetary aggregates (such as Velde 2009) do not lend insight into the transmission mechanism, this section presents data on each as a very informal exploration of which transmission channels might be operational. In this episode, there is evidence that the asset price and interest rate channels, and perhaps even the bank lending channel, were all operative in reducing economic activity. There is little evidence that the exchange rate was an important channel at this particular time. There is also evidence that interest rates responded to the sterilization program (Hanes 2006) . Figure 6 presents the interest rate spread between commercial paper and Treasury bills. In sum, the period of gold sterilization is closely associated with significantly lower equity prices and higher interest rates. The asset price and interest rate movements were likely to have been the way that slower monetary growth affected consumption and investment decisions and thereby reduced real GDP.
Conclusions
The Recession of 1937-38 is often cited as illustrating the dangers of withdrawing fiscal and monetary stimulus too early in a weak recovery (Romer 2009 ). This paper focuses on an understudied change in monetary policy, the decision to sterilize gold inflows during 1937. This decision was made by the Treasury Department rather than the Federal Reserve. The findings presented here suggest that it largely stopped the growth of the monetary base in the period leading into the recession. The monetary base had been growing at a 15 percent annual rate in the months prior to sterilization, so the policy contributed to a significant slowdown in the growth rate of the money supply. Conversely, when the sterilization program was reversed, growth in the money supply resumed and the economy began to recover. 
